After Xi–Putin 2026: Institutionalization, Eastward Rewire, and Japan's Dilemma (Part 4)
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The Meaning of the Agreement Reached in Andong
On May 19, 2026, the leaders of Japan and South Korea met in Andong, South Korea, and agreed to strengthen energy cooperation covering LNG and crude oil supply, reserves, and petroleum product swaps. The language of the meeting was restrained, but the underlying reality was hard. In an era of rising military pressure in Northeast Asia, volatile energy markets, and critical minerals used as diplomatic leverage, Japan is trying to protect fuel and materials through a network of allies and quasi-allies. A Reuters report described the agreement as a move in which energy security and security cooperation overlapped.
This scene reveals the outline of Japan’s Russia strategy. Japan does not trust Russia. Yet it also cannot fully detach itself from resources in the Russian Far East. As defense, electricity, semiconductors, magnets, ports, reserves, and alliances converge on the same strategic map, Japan’s defense line no longer runs only north of Hokkaido. It extends to Sakhalin LNG contracts, mutual support with South Korea, critical-mineral cooperation with the United States, mines in Australia and Canada, and Japan’s domestic industrial base.
Russia as Threat, Russia as Supplier
In Japanese government documents, Russia no longer appears only as a partner for improving relations through economic cooperation. The Ministry of Defense’s Defense of Japan 2025 states that Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine while conducting active military operations around Japan, including the Northern Territories, and that joint aircraft and naval activity with China has also been confirmed. For Japan, Russia has become both a direct northern threat and a source of compound pressure linked to China.
Even so, Japan has not severed all economic contact with Russia. The reason is Sakhalin. The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy’s Energy White Paper 2024 states that Sakhalin 2 accounted for about 9.3 percent of Japan’s LNG imports in 2023 and the equivalent of about 3 percent of total power generation, and that Japan maintains a policy of retaining its interests in Sakhalin 1 and 2. Sakhalin 1 also holds value as a rare non-Middle Eastern source of crude oil for Japan, whose dependence on the Middle East remains high.
This policy does not produce a clean narrative. Japan participates in sanctions on Russia as a G7 member and continues to support Ukraine. At the same time, it preserves resource interests in the Russian Far East to protect stable power generation and fuel supply. Reuters also reported that the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry described overseas energy, especially Sakhalin 1, as important for Japan’s energy security.
Japan’s dilemma lies here. Russia is a security threat. Sakhalin is directly tied to the stability of electricity and fuel. Excessive dependence on Russia creates a political vulnerability, but an abrupt cutoff will feed back into prices, procurement, and spare power-generation capacity. Japan’s choice is not accommodation with Russia. It is realism: receive the minimum necessary energy from a dangerous neighbor while avoiding the permanent lock-in of that dependence.
The Russia Problem Goes Beyond the Northern Territories
Japan-Russia relations once fit easily into three terms: the Northern Territories, a peace treaty, and energy cooperation. That framework no longer captures the problem. Japan’s view of Russia now overlaps with China, the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the Northern Sea Route, LNG markets, crude oil markets, critical minerals, semiconductor materials, and defense-industrial supply chains.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs still upholds the basic policy of resolving the issue of sovereignty over the four Northern Islands and concluding a peace treaty. The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows continuity in Japanese diplomacy and its refusal to shelve the territorial issue. In the security arena, however, Russia is not only a counterpart in Northern Territories negotiations. It is a state that continues military activity around Japan, coordinates actions with China, and controls resources in Sakhalin.
This duality makes Japanese policy look ambiguous. Yet that ambiguity itself functions as strategy. Japan is not trying to reconcile with Russia. It is not trying to withdraw from Russia completely. It keeps its threat perception intact, maintains the broad sanctions framework, and prevents energy supply from collapsing. For an island country without major domestic resources, this design is uncomfortable but difficult to avoid.
Critical Minerals Become a New Defense Line
If Japan intends to avoid locking in dependence on Russia, it must redesign not only energy supply but also material supply chains. The Cabinet Secretariat’s National Security Strategy positions economic strength as a foundation of security policy and stresses Japan’s role in providing high-value-added goods and services that are essential to global supply chains. This approach does not treat the military and industry as separate domains.
Materials related to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s White Paper on International Economy and Trade also identify the risk created by the concentration of critical-mineral supply chains in specific regions. In 2026, Japanese government-backed projects aimed at strengthening supply chains for nickel, lithium, fluorspar, graphite, heavy rare earths, and other materials, with Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Namibia emerging as procurement sources. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry materials show the reality that resource diplomacy has become part of defense policy.
